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**1962/11/06**

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONDRAFTNovember 6, 1962  
4 to 9:30 P.M.  
US Mission, N.Y.

Drafted by A. Akalovsky

SUBJECT: CUBA

PARTICIPANTS: US - Ambassador Stevenson  
Secretary Gilpatrick  
Ambassador Yost  
Mr. AkalovskyUSSR- Mr. Kuznetsov  
Mr. Zorin  
Mr. Mendelevich  
Mr. Zherebtsov

Date: 4/4/92

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FOIA Exemptions  
PA ExemptionsAmbassador Stevenson opened the conversation by inviting

Mr. Kuznetsov to express his views with regard to the ICRC inspection of incoming ships. He noted that the only question that remained in connection with that problem was the matter of the nationality of the ship which would carry the ICRC group. The US Government believed that for many reasons which Mr. Stevenson would understand, a neutral ship, rather than a Soviet ship, should be used. The US was prepared to have the UN charter a one of the Swedish ships which were available in those waters at the present time, and to put it in one slot outside Havana as had been suggested by Mr. Kuznetsov last night.

He observed that in view of the rapidity of the fulfillment by the USSR of its obligation with respect to missile the procedure of verification by the ICRC would be brief.

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- 2 -

Mr. Gusev replied ~~that~~ that the Soviet Government had taken all the steps necessary to fulfill its commitments as soon as possible, and it believed that this was in the interest of both sides. The Soviet Union had understood the published messages by the President and Mr. Khrushchev to contain this idea, and as one could see, the USSR had gone a long way to meet the US in this matter. Thus, both sides should be satisfied, and this fact should play a significant role in ~~the~~ resolving all other questions between the US and the USSR. The Soviet Government ~~wanted to~~ resolve the problem ~~in~~ <sup>at</sup> hand in as speedy a manner as possible and on the basis of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement. It was on the basis of this desire to seek the speediest solution of the problem as a whole, that the Soviet Union approached all practical matters.

As to the point raised by Ambassador Stevenson, ~~that~~ ~~he~~ he wished to remind the US side of what *had* already been discussed and agreed with respect to verification by the ICMS of Soviet in-bound ships. It had been agreed that ICMS teams would be able to ascertain the nature of the cargo carried to Cuba on board Soviet ships. Procedure for such verification had also been discussed. If the US side had any additional questions to raise, he would be happy to hear them, although the USSR had believed that this matter had been settled. He agreed that this procedure should be of short duration, in any event, not longer than the period

until the departure of loaded ships from Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson congratulated Mr. Kuznetsov with the speed at which the USSR had been complying with the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding with regard to missiles. He said he was sure that mutual accord on matters of detail was wanted by both sides in order to resolve this problem as agreeably as possible.

As to further questions with regard to ICRC verification procedure, aside from the question of the nationality of the ship, he was not competent to discuss them, and ~~there~~<sup>they</sup> had been taken up in conversations between Ambassador Yost and Ambassador Morozov. He did believe, however, that one question that might remain on this aspect of the problem, in addition to the question of nationality of the ship, was related to Mr. Kuznetsov's remark that ICRC verification would apply only to incoming Soviet ships. He reminded Mr. Kuznetsov that verification by the ICRC had been envisioned as a substitute for the guarantee by the US Navy, which related to all incoming ships. ~~For~~<sup>As</sup> Mr. Kuznetsov's remark covered all Soviet and Soviet ship ships, that was in accord with our understanding.

Mr. Kuznetsov inquired whether Mr. Stevenson, in speaking of other ships, and in particular of the ships from the Socialist countries, meant all such ships or also those ~~which~~ which had been chartered by the USSR to take Soviet cargo to Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson said he meant Soviet flag ships, Soviet chartered ships, Socialist Bloc ships, and Socialist Bloc chartered ships, although he did not know whether there were any of the latter category. He clarified that he meant all ships in these categories which had been loaded at Soviet or Soviet Bloc ports.

Mr. Kuznetsov said he was surprised that the US was putting the question this way. He wished to point out that this matter was entirely outside the framework of US - USSR relations, and that the USSR had understood that the question had ~~always~~ been only of Soviet ships. He ~~never~~ asserted that this understanding flowed from the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of correspondence. Now, however, the US suggested that all ships from Socialist countries were to be verified. He wondered whether the US fully understood what this meant in terms of national sovereignty and international law, because the US apparently wanted the Soviet Union to decide this matter on behalf of many other countries. ~~The USSR could~~ do no such thing, since only the countries concerned could make such decisions. Thus, this approach was quite unacceptable to the USSR; it went far beyond what had been said here and in the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding. It only complicated the matter and put ICRC verification on a new basis. Generally speaking, it appeared strange that one should think the two sides could ~~not~~ decide matters affecting

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the economic and political interests of all countries in the world. The Soviet Delegation was not authorized to do so, and this approach was not in accord with the constructive attitude one must display toward the solution of the problem at hand. One could also add that the so-called ICMC verification procedure had been accepted at the insistence of the US on verifying that no Soviet offensive weapons were being shipped to Cuba on board Soviet vessels. The USSR regarded the so-called quarantine by the US as <sup>being</sup> illegal, contrary to international law and to the freedom of the seas, and as a violation of the United Nations Charter. Therefore, the USSR could not agree at all that ICMC verification could in any way be regarded as a substitute for the quarantine.

If the US was really seeking a solution on the basis of mutual understanding, could it really believe that the Soviet Government, after its statements and after <sup>what it</sup> had done to resolve the problem, would send offensive armaments on board other ships? Such an attitude could be regarded only as a manifestation of the United States unwillingness to adhere to the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, to raise new questions, and to complicate the solution of this very simple problem.

Ambassador Stevenson said he wished to go back and remind Mr. Kuznetsov that the US quarantine had been imposed on transport of offensive weapons by ships of any country. Although this was not a very important point, he also wished to remind Mr.

Kuznetsov that the proposal to internationalize this procedure by using the services of the ICRC had been made by the Soviet Union or U Thant.

Mr. Kuznetsov interjected that the proposal had not been made by the Soviet Union, and that the US press had distorted the facts in this respect.

Ambassador Stevenson continued that the purpose of inspection of the incoming cargo in the interim period was to avoid the difficulties which might be experienced by some countries in connection with the quarantine. The US was <sup>now</sup> prepared to exclude from the verification procedure ~~all~~ ships other than Soviet and Soviet Bloc ships loaded in Soviet and Soviet Bloc ports. The US <sup>was making</sup> ~~was making~~ a big step forward in excluding other ships. This was a concession, and we were surprised that Mr. Kuznetsov should say that this was a new point. We hoped that this relatively minor matter could be resolved. Nothing was involved here ~~except to obtain consent from USSR's friends as far as their ships were concerned.~~ As to Cuban economy, it would not be affected. The movement of Soviet or Soviet Bloc ships would be affected only for minutes or a few hours at most.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that this clarification did not add anything to what could be done to solve this essentially simple matter. Frankly speaking, the US was trying to put <sup>to</sup> the USSR the impossible demand that it decide certain matters for other

states. This was not the way the USSR acted; the USSR respected the sovereignty, the territorial integrity, and the laws of other countries. The USSR did not interfere in the international affairs of other countries, and did not resolve problems for them. The USSR was against imposing certain solutions on other states. On the basis of these principles, it was clear that it was far beyond the competence and the jurisdiction of the USSR to consider such matters as had been suggested by Mr. Stevenson. In a way, one could understand the US concern when Ambassador Stevenson spoke of Soviet chartered vessels carrying Soviet cargo. ~~Something~~<sup>was</sup> The US could conceivably ask whether the USSR had prepared to allow inspection of Soviet cargo on board such ships, but of course / the USSR could not decide this question for the companies from which these vessels were chartered. All in all the US demands were not in accord with international law and could not promote solution of the problem at hand. Mr. Kuznetsov ~~was~~<sup>was</sup> asked to appeal to the US not to insist on this point. Only a relatively short period of time was involved and lengthy arguments on this point could only complicate the matter and delay its solution. If the US wanted to verify all ships, it should not involve the USSR in such an unjust and unlawful undertaking.

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Mr. Kuznetsov then quoted from the President's October 23 message, which spoke of "your" ships, and interpreted this language as applying only to Soviet ships and not even to Soviet chartered ships. Thus he saw no basis for US insistence on subjecting ships from other countries to verification. He thought such insistence <sup>meet with</sup> would ~~find~~ <sup>meet with</sup> an unfavorable reaction/ on the part of other countries.

Ambassador Stevenson reiterated that the US ~~position~~ related to all ships and that the ICRC verification ~~procedure~~ <sup>observed</sup> was to replace the quarantine. In this connection, ~~he~~ <sup>observed</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> ~~the President's October 23 message~~ that Mr. Kuznetsov's quotation from the President's October 23 message related to <sup>in this</sup> all ships used by the USSR ~~navigation/traffic~~. ~~Furthermore~~ Furthermore, the final agreement clearly related to all ships. The surprise expressed by Mr. Kuznetsov was shared by us because there was no question that the US wanted to substitute ~~substitution~~ verification for US inspection of incoming ships. ~~However~~, if Mr. Kuznetsov insisted, we were prepared to use ~~the same procedure~~ with respect to Soviet ships and these willing to accept it. As to other ships, we would continue using the present procedure. If this was acceptable to the Soviet Union, we were prepared to discuss this alternative. As to Mr. Kuznetsov's remark about Soviet influence over other countries, that was not the point; the point was to obtain consent from those countries. If those countries gave their

comment, and he had no doubt that they would, we would limit the verification procedure to the class of ships indicated earlier. We could make <sup>the</sup> ICRC procedure as broad or as narrow as appropriate, if the USSR wished it to be applied only to Soviet ships, then the quarantine would be applied to other ships. However, as we understood it, the ICRC procedure was to replace the quarantine in general.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that Ambassador Stevenson's interpretation of the President's October 23 message could only make one smile. Ambassador Stevenson was trying to read too much into it. The ~~xxx~~ phrase in question did not allow any such interpretation. It was surprising that such an experienced person as Ambassador Stevenson would interpret such a simple and clear phrase in this manner. As to Ambassador Stevenson's suggestion that the US might use different procedures with respect to different vessels, he wished to stress that he spoke and could speak only for the USSR and its ships.

~~Ambassador Stevenson~~ should not attempt to make him a partner <sup>his</sup> in any effort to justify the quarantine and its continuance. ~~His speech~~ <sup>He</sup> regarded the US quarantine as an unlawful measure and the sooner it was lifted the better it would be for all the peoples of the world.

Mr. Kuznetsov said he wished to repeat that the USSR agreed to have the ICRC observe Soviet ships. As to ships belonging to other countries, the USSR could not ~~xxx~~ enter

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- 10 -

into any commitments. The US was free to use any procedure it deemed desirable with respect to other ships, but that was a matter of its own responsibility. He wished to point out that while the USSR was removing what the US called offensive missiles and ~~withdrawing~~ <sup>at a time</sup> when the completion of that removal was a matter of hours or days, the US did not wish to move even a little from its position on the quarantine imposed on October 23. Such an attitude on the part of the United States created only a negative impression. ~~Ambassador~~ Stevenson had just admitted that the quarantine was ~~not useful~~ in any practical respect to the United States, since the USSR was firmly adhering to its obligations and was not shipping any offensive weapons to Cuba. The USSR believed that the quarantine was a reflection of the continuation of the situation of crisis. It affected adversely the relations between the US and the USSR and the relations between the US and Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson noted that much time had been spent on this subject and that perhaps no useful purpose would be served by continuing this discussion. There were more important and immediate problems to discuss. However, he wished to stress once again that the whole context of the President's October 23 message related to ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> quarantine affecting all ships going to Cuba. The phrase "your ships" related to all ships used by the USSR for transporting cargo to Cuba.

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The US wanted to lift the quarantine in accordance with the second numbered paragraph of the President's October 27 letter, which stated "We, on our part, would agree ~~that~~ -- upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments-- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect. . . . ". Arrangements <sup>had</sup> ~~have~~ been made by the UN and as soon as they were established, ~~the~~ quarantine would be lifted.

Ambassador Stevenson then suggested that this ~~question be~~ put aside for the time being, but reiterated that the US would lift the quarantine as soon as international arrangements in lieu of the quarantine were implemented until the transaction was completed.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that in view of the fact that Mr. Stevenson wished to move to another subject he wanted to state that the USSR agreed to have the ICRC observe Soviet ships going to Cuba. The USSR believed that this question ~~had been~~ ~~was resolved~~ and if any delay should occur in implementing ~~this agreement~~, the USSR could not be held responsible. If the US wanted to use the quarantine against other ships, it was its own business and the USSR did not wish to be involved. However, the USSR believed that a speedy lifting of the quarantine would ~~serve the interests of the world~~ promote the solution of the problem at hand and serve the interests of world peace.

Ambassador Stevenson reverted to the question of the nationality of the ship to carry the ICRC group. He regretted that the US Government could not accept the use of a Soviet ship, and thought that the quickest way to resolve this problem was to accept a Swedish vessel. The US was prepared to accept any other neutral ship, but according to our information the only available neutral ships in those waters were Swedish.

Mr. Kuznetsov replied that the Soviet Government, taking into account its exchange of views with the US and U Thant, had agreed to verification by ICRC teams of Soviet Cuba-bound ships as long ago as on October 29. The Soviet Union had also stated its readiness to make a Soviet ship available to transport these teams. Later, practical aspects of this matter were discussed by Messrs. Yost, <sup>W</sup>Marozov, Mandelevisch, and Marasimhan. The USSR had believed there was no objection to using a Soviet ship. It was yesterday that the US ~~ambassador's~~ <sup>Delegation</sup> had for the first time indicated that it could not yet agree and that it had to consult its Government. That position was different from what the USSR had understood it to be until then. From the technical standpoint, if one wished the speediest implementation of these arrangements, the simplest solution would be to use the ALMATA, which was near Havana and ready

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to take ICRC parties on board. This question was <sup>a</sup>purely technical one, and there was no need to review this problem once again because ~~it~~ <sup>that</sup> would only cause delay. He wished to appeal to the US not to insist on reconsidering this matter. After all, protracted discussions of this question had taken place, and any reconsideration would mean a step backward. The Soviet Delegation had sent the proposal for using a Soviet ship to the Soviet Government, which in turn had given instructions to the Soviet ship to remain in that area. The fact that the US was now raising this <sup>question</sup> ~~matter~~ again indicated that the US did not want to adopt a business-like approach in this purely technical matter. That was surprising because Americans were known as business-like people.

Ambassador Yost observed that we had understood ~~that~~ the USSR had originally proposed ~~xxxxxx~~ that either a Soviet or a neutral ship be used. We had made a counter-proposal and suggested that a US ship - a Coast Guard vessel, a Navy ~~transport~~, or a commercial vessel - be used. For several ~~days~~ there had been no reply. Then the USSR announced that this was unacceptable ~~x~~ and that it wanted a Soviet ship. However, the US had the same objections to using a Soviet ship as the USSR had to using a US vessel. Therefore we believed that the simplest solution would be to go back to the original proposal and use a neutral ship. We understood that several Swedish ships were in the Caribbean area, and at least

some of them were available for this purpose. Thus our latest proposal to the Secretary-General was to use a neutral ship in accordance with the Soviet original suggestion.

Ambassador Stevenson commented that since both sides had said they would accept a neutral ship, they should follow Mr. Kuznetsov's advice to be business-like and adopt what they both had agreed to be acceptable.

Mr. Kuznetsov acknowledged that Ambassador Yost was correct in saying that the original Soviet proposal had been to use a Soviet or a neutral ship. However, in order to put the record straight, he wished to point out that later no one had objected to the USSR's making preparations for the utilization of a Soviet ship; now that the vessel had been made available, the US objected. <sup>nevertheless</sup> ~~however~~, Mr. Kuznetsov continued, he had listened to Ambassador Stevenson with attention and understanding and he agreed with him there was no need to argue about what ship should be used for ICRC teams, though ~~by this dialogue~~ with Ambassador Stevenson where he said that ~~the US's reasons~~ for objecting to the use of a Soviet vessel were the same as those the USSR had for objecting to the use of an American vessel. The point was that US ships were used to implement the quarantine, and now the US wanted to use a US ship for ICRC verification. Nevertheless, he believed this matter could be easily resolved. As soon as he and his associates came back to their offices, they would discuss this

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question and ~~they~~ would inform the US Delegation of their position as soon as possible, perhaps by telephone.

In ~~this~~ this connection, he wondered whether Ambassador Stevenson could provide any detailed information about the Swedish ship which was under consideration. Unless this was a military secret, he would like to know the name/ of the ship and the other pertinent data.

Ambassador Stevenson thanked Mr. Kuznetsov and said that somebody would be available at the US Mission to take his call.

He then recalled that Mr. Kuznetsov had given us a list of ships leaving <sup>Havana</sup>/today and tomorrow and carrying missiles and related equipment, and suggested that the USSR provide a schedule for the shipping of the 42 missiles Mr. Kuznetsov had said had been or were in Cuba. If the USSR could give us the time and place for rendezvous, we could follow the method of verifying the out-going ships as suggested by Mr. ~~McGlo~~ Mr. McGloy the other day. US vessels could come along Soviet vessels and, depending upon operational conditions, ~~they~~ we could verify the presence of missiles on board Soviet ships either from the US vessel or an unarmed helicopter through visual observation and photography. For that purpose we suggested that the cover be removed at least in part from one or two missiles so as to make it possible to identify the cargo as missiles, but without revealing the technical specifications

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of the missiles. The taking of photographs would make it possible to check the number of missiles and to see whether the total matched with ~~xxxxxx~~<sup>that</sup> indicated by Mr. Kuznetsov.

Secretary Gilpatrick commented that the inspection procedure suggested was the minimum necessary to count the number of missiles visible either from helicopters or the deck of US vessels, so that the number of 42 which had been indicated by Mr. Kuznetsov to Mr. McCloy could be verified. We assumed that, as Mr. Kuznetsov had indicated, all missiles would be on deck. In addition, to ascertain that missiles were on board we wished to take photographs of partly exposed missiles so that we could be satisfied that missiles constituted the cargo. ~~xxxxxxx~~ We did not expect the USSR to reveal all missiles or their technical characteristics. Two modes of observation would be used, depending on the condition of the sea. If in case of rough seas, it might not be possible to approach the Soviet vessels <sup>personnel</sup> close enough to observe or photograph. In that case our ~~personnel~~ <sup>personnel</sup> would fly in an unarmed helicopter to observe and take pictures.

Mr. Kuznetsov said he had listened with interest to Ambassador Stevenson's and Secretary Gilpatrick's comments, but was not ready to reply to all questions right away. He would endeavor to do so in the near future. He then recalled that the Soviet Delegation had provided a list of

Soviet ships leaving Havana today and tomorrow. According to that list, one ship was to leave today and eight tomorrow. In connection with the first question asked by Ambassador Stevenson, i.e., whether the USSR ~~could~~ provide a schedule for the transport of missiles, the Soviet Delegation had received information that those nine ships would be carrying what the US called offensive armaments, including missiles. He said that he would ask for a confirmation of that information from the Soviet Government. As to the Soviet Union indicating the places and times for rendezvous for the purpose of visual observation, he had no specific suggestion, but did not believe there would be any objection if the US were to suggest the places ~~x~~ for that purpose. If Ambassador Stevenson had some views on this point now, they would <sup>be</sup> immediately communicated ~~to~~ to Moscow so that appropriate orders could be given to the ships concerned. It was necessary to ~~ask~~ <sup>act</sup> promptly since one ship had already left Havana. With regard to the use of helicopters, only ~~the vessels~~ had been mentioned so far, but since this question had been raised, the Soviet Delegation would inform its Government and would probably receive a prompt reply. The same applied to the question of removing the covers.

Mr. Kuznetsov continued that he wished to state in this connection that the US should not really have doubts about Mr. Khrushchev's statements ~~xxxxxxxx~~ and about what

was being done by the USSR. The information he had given proved the Soviet Union's good faith. The figures he had mentioned made it possible for Mr. Gilpatric to verify his intelligence data, but it also indicated that the USSR was willing to resolve this problem as promptly as possible. He hoped that the US would reciprocate the spirit in which these steps had been taken. Then, all questions ~~we~~ could be quickly resolved.

Secretary Gilpatric said that as far as the ~~places for~~ rendezvous were concerned, that was within the province of the Navy Command. He suggested that the Soviet Delegation give us the call signs of Soviet ships so that the US Navy could contact them, and then the Masters could work out between ~~themselves~~ themselves the place and time for the rendezvous, so as not to impede the movement of Soviet ships. It was quite clear ~~that~~ not all of the rendezvous would ~~take~~ occur at the same place. Thus we suggested that when the Soviet delegation gave us the other <sup>radio</sup> ~~sign~~, it could also give us the call signs of the ships concerned, which we would ~~then~~ ~~transmit~~ transmit to our ships by radio.

Mr. Kuznetsov agreed but suggested that <sup>the</sup> ~~the~~ US could perhaps give the Soviet Delegation the call signs of US vessels, so that Soviet Masters would know that they were being called by authorized vessels. One must bear in mind that both Soviet and US Masters were probably rather nervous nowadays

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- 19 -

and such an arrangement would avoid <sup>possible</sup> misunderstandings.

Ambassador Stevenson then turned to the question of removal of warheads, and suggested that the Soviet Union could perhaps furnish the number of warheads and the schedule of their removal following the pattern envisioned for missiles. He thought that the verification procedure contemplated for missiles could be applied to warheads as well, with one difference, i.e., Geiger counters should be placed ~~in~~ <sup>along</sup> enough to warhead containers to detect the radio ~~active material~~ therein.

Secretary Gilpatric added that the assumption was that the warheads would be in such containers as would not reveal their contents. Rather than asking for their opening, we suggested that the checking be done ~~by means~~ as outlined by Ambassador Stevenson, and there would be no inspection.

Mr. Grometsov wondered what he could say on this subject. He thought he could only repeat and somewhat refresh ~~Ambassador~~ Ambassador Stevenson's memory what he had said yesterday. He had hoped that the views expressed by him yesterday would be favorably considered by the US and that the US would not insist on this point. As Secretary Gilpatric surely understood from <sup>the</sup> technical standpoint ~~this~~ this problem was different from the problem of missiles.

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It should not be approached in a strictly technical manner, because it affected many questions relating to the US-USSR agreement and <sup>to</sup> the question of how the US intended to approach the settlement of those questions without complicating the situation and without putting obstacles in the path toward agreement, both on specific issues as well as on the Cuban problem as a whole. He said he could solemnly repeat once again that the USSR was conducting the negotiations honestly and intended to fulfill honestly and scrupulously the commitments undertaken by Mr. Khrushchev on behalf of the Soviet Government, and the US ~~must~~ should have no doubt that in removing the missiles, the USSR would also remove all the related equipment. He said he was sure that the raising of this question by the US at yesterday's meeting, which of course had been reported to the Soviet Government, had made an unfavorable impression on Moscow. The US should judge the situation for itself: the Soviet Union had demolished its rocket sites in Cuba, it had transported the equipment ~~in parts and~~ loaded it on ships, and was prepared, taking account of the President's view, to ship this equipment to the USSR very quickly. All this demonstrated that the USSR wanted to carry out the understanding reached as soon as possible. But the US demands with respect <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ warheads only complicated the matter and could delay the solution of the whole problem. In this connection, he wished to appeal once again to Ambassador Stevenson and Secretary

Gilpatrick to ~~xxx~~ consider the Soviet views one more time. He wished to repeat what he had said yesterday, namely, that the objective of these negotiations was to liquidate the tense situation which had threatened with nuclear war. The basis for these negotiations must be the agreement reached between the President and Mr. Khrushchev. The substance of that agreement was: (a) the USSR was to ~~remove~~ the missiles which the President regarded as offensive, and (b) the US was to give assurances against invasion of Cuba either by the US or by its allies in the Western Hemisphere.

It was only on this basis that the tense situation in ~~xxx~~ the Caribbean area could be resolved. Many steps had already been taken in that direction, and, as was clear to everyone, primarily by the USSR. However, both sides should try to come closer together, and solutions must be the result of compromise and mutual concessions, and the final agreement must satisfy both sides.

~~Mr. Gromyko~~ <sup>if</sup> continued that ~~the~~ the US raised additional questions, ~~then~~ the USSR could also find many questions which were of concern to ~~it~~ it and which <sup>vitaly</sup> affected its security. The USSR could raise as many questions as the United States. The US Delegation knew what he meant, but the USSR was not raising those questions because it believed that the framework of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding provided a sufficient basis for the solution of this problem.

Furthermore, some of those questions might affect not only our two states. He said he wished to reiterate that the USSR had fulfilled its obligations. It had removed the missiles and the related equipment, as well as the warheads. (Zorin passed a note to the interpreter and the latter ~~failed to~~ ~~omit the reference to~~ omitted the reference to warheads from his translation.) In addition to these steps, the following must be done: (1) the quarantine should be lifted immediately, and (2) arrangements guaranteeing against recurrence of such a dangerous situation must be ~~formulated~~. This would be a good beginning for the solution of other problems in the world, and the US Delegation knew what problems he had in mind.

Mr. Kuznetsov went on to say that the question raised by Ambassador Stevenson complicated the matter and did not indicate that the US was seeking to liquidate the dangerous situation. In the view of the Soviet Union, what had already ~~been done by~~ the USSR made it possible to come to agreement ~~on this and~~ to create a favorable atmosphere for the solution ~~of other problems~~. The destinies of all peoples in the world were affected by this situation. The USSR wished to live in friendship with the United States on the basis of the principle of peaceful ~~existence~~ coexistence. Unfortunately, the question raised by the United States about warheads did not prove that the US was taking a similar approach.

Ambassador Stevenson said he would not attempt to review all the points raised by Mr. Kuznetsov. While he knew that Mr. Kuznetsov did not like to be asked questions, he still wondered why it was unreasonable to ask about the most destructive component of weapons, because after all what made weapons offensive was the warhead. Was it really unreasonable to ask the ammunition to be removed together with the gun? He could not see why the USSR was unwilling to give the same kind of assurances with regard to warheads as it was willing to give with respect to carriers.

Secretary Gilpatric noted that whenever the US considered it necessary for its own defense and the defense of its allies to place in the hands of others weapons of the type we were dealing with now, it felt the greatest sense of responsibility with regard to the <sup>destructive</sup> portion of the weapons systems and maintained the strictest control over that portion to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of warheads. As a great power we had the responsibility of preventing the have of a thermo-nuclear war, and the USSR, which was also a great power, should display a similar sense of responsibility. Secretary Gilpatric continued that we did not seek the revelation of any significant characteristics of the weapons but only wished to be assured that when offensive arms were removed <sup>from Cuba</sup> and returned to the USSR, they would carry the dangerous component, which we were sure was controlled by Soviet officers



~~that~~  
there, and/~~sk~~ that component would not be left there without such control. In other words, we wanted to be assured that the when/~~weapons~~ and the Soviet personnel left they would take with them the essential part of the weapons system.

Mr. Kusnetsov did not believe there was any need for a detailed discussion on this subject. What he/<sup>had</sup>heard from the US side showed that the USSR had an entirely ~~different~~ view on this matter. He regretted that the US Delegation ignored the statements by Mr. Khrushchev in which it ~~had~~ been explicitly stated that everything related to ~~what the~~ US called offensive missiles would be removed from Cuba. As to responsibility, the USSR knew and was fully/~~aware~~ of the problem, and it acted with extreme caution and responsibility. The steps taken by the USSR proved that. He then said that Mr. Gilpatric's remarks appeared to admit the USSR's right to be concerned with its security. In this connection, he must say that ~~the~~ US policy had created a <sup>or</sup> ~~situation where~~ the USSR, <sup>having</sup> had been placed in a position where its security was under constant threat as a result of the numerous bases around the USSR, bases at which the same type of weapon was stationed as that referred to in the <sup>President's</sup> ~~present~~ message. The US considered those weapons to be defensive, but one could argue at length as to what was offensive and what defensive. In this connection, he wished to refer to <sup>the</sup> November 5/~~4~~ issue of the US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT

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containing an interview with Defense Secretary McNamara, in which he stated that it was very difficult to draw a distinction between offensive and defensive weapons.

Mr. Kuznetsov said he did not wish to go into this now, although he might wish to do so later; the only thing he wanted to do now was to repeat that the US should consider this problem taking into account the views expressed by the USSR.

Amb. Stevenson stressed that rockets were not weapons without warheads; nor were bombers weapons without bombs. We had talked about the removal of weapons from Cuba, and we had reached agreement on such removal. The US was now trying to devise methods of implementing that agreement. If the USSR did not try to help devise such methods, we were confronted with a very serious situation. He urged Mr. Kuznetsov to report to his government about this problem, where we had been able to plan only a partial removal of weapons. ~~He~~ He appreciated Mr. Kuznetsov's remark that this was perhaps not a question where he could <sup>go</sup> say anything further now. Therefore, unless Mr. Gilpatric had something to add, perhaps tonight we could use our time more economically by dropping this question now and resuming it at the first opportunity.

Secretary Gilpatric emphasized the importance of the matter and the need of resuming its discussion at the first

opportunity. He ~~has~~ pointed out that what had been said so far was no solution.

Mr. Kuznetsov responded that the Soviet Government had been strictly fulfilling the commitments set forth in Mr. Khrushchev's message. He wished to state resolutely and to stress that the question was not one of partial fulfillment, as Ambassador Stevenson had attempted to imply. The USSR was fulfilling its commitments completely, and if the US ~~minister~~ referred to a very serious situation, that indicated only that it wished to complicate matters. In the USSR, this problem was very clear and had been resolved strictly in accordance with the agreement reached. Observing that he did not intend to argue whether a rocket without a warhead was a weapon, or vice versa, Mr. Kuznetsov said he wished to stress once again that the actions taken by the USSR, which was <sup>fully complying with</sup> ~~fulfilling~~ its obligations, gave provided every basis for the solution of the outstanding issues.

Mr. Stevenson wondered whether <sup>or not</sup> he should infer from ~~Mr. Kuznetsov's~~ statement that this was the end of the subject ~~for~~ as the USSR was concerned. He recalled his statement that this was a very serious situation, and expressed the hope that Mr. Kuznetsov would confer with his government and his associates, so that we could return to this matter as promptly as possible. From what Mr. Kuznetsov had said, it could be inferred that there was nothing to

discuss, but we hoped this was not so.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that he could add nothing to what he had already said.

Amb. Stevenson then said another very serious situation had arisen in connection with the activation of the surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba this morning. He could only say that in the absence of ground verification of the compliance with the agreement, the US was obliged to conduct aerial surveillance to monitor the removal of weapons from Cuba. This morning, we had found the SAM sites activated, and therefore, he was obliged to say to Mr. Kuznetsov and Mr. Zorin that we must protest any interference with the conduct of this aerial surveillance during the period of ~~mutual~~ completion of the transaction. We had hoped and expected that in view of the possibility of instituting international inspection on the ground, there would be no such interference with our precautionary measures. We must therefore ask the Soviet Union to ensure that there should be no recurrence of such interference during the completion of the transaction in as close a conformity with the agreements reached as possible.

Mr. Gilpatrick commented that since October 27, when a US officer flying a <sup>un-armed</sup> ~~unarmed~~ aircraft had been shot down, none of the SAM sites had been activated. Therefore, we had been able in this period when no ground inspection

existed to verify the removal of weapons, and here we meant medium-range bombers and missiles, to inform ourselves with regard to the status of those weapons. Thus, this was a very important matter. If the SAM sites continued to be kept inoperative <sup>they had been</sup> during the past ten days, that would avoid the need by the US to take other measures in order to make <sup>its</sup> ~~the~~ aerial surveillance effective.

Mr. Kuznetsov agreed that this was an important ~~and~~ <sup>that</sup> major question, but said ~~that~~ it demonstrated <sup>that</sup> the US was pursuing a policy of gross violation of the sovereignty of other states. Such policy could not promote ~~an~~ trust between the US and the country being overflown. He observed that he had discussed this question before. However, he felt that he must ~~say~~ state once again that such overflights were categorically objected to by Cuba. This attitude on the part of Cuba was fully understandable, because any country would be indignant if such gross violations of its sovereignty were to take place. One ~~must take into account~~ the fact that such actions greatly affected the national feelings of the Cuban people. The US was now appealing to the USSR. The USSR had its ~~own~~ own view in this matter, and frankly the US would be well advised to stop such overflights right away. There was no need for such flights now: <sup>The</sup> cargo containing the so-called offensive weapons was now in ports and would be shipped within two or three days. Now, that the conditions

~~referred to~~ in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange had been met, i.e., the missile sites had been dismantled and the missiles were being loaded and would be shipped shortly, there was no need for such flights. He continued that he could not accept Amb. Stevenson's statement that/the USSR ~~must take steps~~ to prevent recurrence. Cuba was a sovereign nation and the USSR based its relations with other nations on respect for their sovereignty. The US should also base its policy on the same principle. US overflights created a bad impression not only in Cuba but throughout the world. The impression was that the US was flouting international law, and such actions by the US created a grave situation. The US was on violating all the norms of international law in the seas, in the air and on the ground. ~~Moreover~~ More than that, the US now wanted the USSR to be its accomplice in this undertaking. Obviously the USSR could do no such thing. The USSR wished the US to stop these flights, because there was no need for them, and especially now.

Mr. Gromyko continued that/since Amb. Stevenson had ~~asked for~~ Soviet help, he wished to suggest that the way to ~~solve~~ <sup>radically</sup> this problem and to improve ~~the~~ US-Cuban relations was to formalize the US obligations <sup>with respect</sup> to Cuba. If the main cause of this situation, i.e., the aggressive actions by the US, was not removed, it might lead to dangerous consequences. Thus the best way to resolve this

**SECRET**

In order to normalize its relations with the small country of Cuba, the US should also lift the measures aimed at starving Cuba to death. Also, the US should fulfill the desires of the Cuban people with regard to Guantanamo. Then the Cuban Government and the Cuban people would no doubt have the friendliest relations with the United States, and there would be no conflict. Nor would there be any need for overflights. Otherwise, there was no guarantee that the situation would not become acute again. The USSR sincerely believed that if such obligations were assumed, it would be desirable to institute a system for ~~the~~ <sup>to</sup> ~~their~~ <sup>the</sup> ~~fulfillment~~ <sup>fulfillment</sup>. ~~afterwards obligations~~ Mr. Kuznetsov <sup>that</sup> said in this connection he wished to remind ~~Am.~~ Stevenson of U Thant's suggestion for the creation of a UN presence in the Caribbean area. While he understood that the initial US reaction to this suggestion was not very favorable, the USSR believed that if one sincerely desired to secure lasting

~~peace in this part of the world such as~~ presence could play <sup>a positive</sup> role. As the USSR understood the suggestion, such presence would cover the ~~the~~ territory of the US, Cuba and some other Latin American <sup>States</sup> ~~states~~, of course with the consent of those states. Such an arrangement would be a great step forward toward normalizing the situation in that area, and it would remove all problems, including that of over- flights.

Amb. Stevenson observed that the discussion ~~had wandered~~ far afield, though he appreciated Mr. Kuznetsov's ~~advice~~ with respect to US relations with Cuba. He suggested that we return to weapons ~~issues~~ and noted Mr. Kuznetsov's remark that all weapons had been removed. With Mr. Kuznetsov's permission, <sup>he</sup> wished to ask how <sup>we</sup> could ~~we~~ know that this was so. In fact, Mr. Kuznetsov refused to include the IL-28 aircraft in the category of weapons to be removed, he refused to give us assurance in regard to warheads, and ~~we~~ <sup>he</sup> refused to prevent interference by SAM sites with ~~our~~ overflights.

Secretary Gilpatrick stressed that the US must treat the Soviet Government as <sup>the</sup> countervail in ~~the~~ ~~situation~~ <sup>with respect to interference by SAM sites</sup>.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that no one was threatening the United States; on the contrary, it was the US which threatened others and did not want to state that it wanted to secure



~~peaceful~~ life and guarantee <sup>the</sup> security for other states, such as Cuba. Ambassador Stevenson's remarks with regard to what the USSR had not done only indicated that the US did not wish to admit, although Amb. Stevenson had admitted it before, what the USSR had done. If <sup>the</sup> US wished to discuss the ~~question~~ IL-28 aircraft, that could be done, but ~~as that~~ would be outside the framework of the agreement reached. As to Mr. Gilpatric's remark, he wished to say that Cuba was a <sup>sovereign</sup> ~~sovereign~~ state. The Cuban Government was concerned <sup>about</sup> ~~about~~ the security of Cuba and ~~worried~~ with the violations of its territorial waters and air space. When Mr. Gilpatric said that the Soviet Union was responsible for the situation, he showed that he did not wish to take into account what the Soviet Union had done. The Soviet Union had completed everything it had committed itself to do. However, if the US did all sorts of things in Cuba and Cuba reacted, ~~the~~ responsibility would ~~be~~ rest with the US, and it could not ~~be placed on~~ the USSR. All this demonstrated that the US <sup>was one of</sup> ~~was one of~~ non-adherence <sup>to</sup> ~~the~~ international law <sup>and the Charter.</sup>

Amb. Stevenson ~~he~~ said that constant repetition by Mr. Kuznetsov of what the USSR had done led him to revert to what had been discussed last night, i.e., the question of the IL-28 aircraft and their weapons. Mr. Kuznetsov had said that this ~~the~~ question had been ~~raised~~ for the

first time on November 2. However, we did not believe ~~that~~ there was any ambiguity in the President's October 22 statement, ~~in~~ which ~~he~~ said: "In addition, jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared." Furthermore, in his own letter to the Secretary General of the UN on October 22, ~~reference~~ had been made to "offensive nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons". In his statements in the Security Council on October 23 and 25, he had also referred ~~to~~ to bomber aircraft. Thus, there was no need to advert/<sup>to</sup> these long talks about whether the US regarded the IL-28 aircraft as offensive within the language in Mr. Khrushchev's message.

Am. Stevenson continued that as far as Soviet compliance with its obligations was concerned, the fact was that the IL-28 aircraft were still there, and yesterday Mr. Kuznetsov had indicated that they would not be removed; today, Mr. Kuznetsov had indicated that there would be no verification of warheads; and, also today, Mr. Kuznetsov had indicated that we could conduct aerial surveillance at our own risk. He ~~said that~~ <sup>he</sup> did not wish to lecture Mr. Kuznetsov, but he sincerely hoped that the Soviet Government would consider these matters carefully.

[REDACTED]

The IL-28 problem was being taken up by the President with Mr. Khrushchev today. All other matters on which we had encountered negative response here would also have to be taken up in Moscow unless they could be resolved here.

Mr. Kuznetsov observed that Mr. Sgevenson had <sup>raised</sup> made a point which had been discussed yesterday. Since Mr. Stevenson had made some additional remarks and attempted to describe the Soviet position as one of non-fulfillment of something, a reply was called for.

Mr. Kuznetsov said <sup>that</sup> as to the contents of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, the President's letter to Mr. Khrushchev of October 27 stated that "the first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of being offensive use to be rendered inoperable..." Thus, the stress here was on the offensive aspect of weapons, and there was no reference to the IL-28 aircraft. If we analyzed all of the US-USSR correspondence and discussions, there was no doubt that the two sides had <sup>been</sup> talking all the time about ICBM's and MRBM's. While it was true that the US had made certain declarations and had submitted lists of items, they were unilateral documents and could not be regarded as part of

-35-

the agreement. After again referring to Secretary McNamara's statement about <sup>the</sup> difficulty of drawing a distinction between offensive and defensive weapons, Mr. Kuznetsov recalled that as to the IL-28 aircraft the USSR had given the US some <sup>of their</sup> specifications, ~~of the aircraft~~. He said he wished to repeat that those aircraft could not be regarded as offensive, because they were fifteen years old and could be used only for coastal defenses and even then with anti-aircraft cover. ~~However, he~~ <sup>He also</sup> wished to repeat that the US raising this question of the IL-28 aircraft indicated that the US was trying to bring up additional questions and thereby complicate the matter. There were many questions, and if they were raised that would not help the matter. Insistence by the United States on such additional questions would only entail a continuation of the crisis in the area under discussion. These additional questions were unjustified and only made the situation more tense. The USSR believed that the two sides must proceed on the basis of the ~~current~~ <sup>existing</sup> understanding. However, the points made by the US in these talks indicated that the US wanted to go back to the tense situation of some days ago. That would not be in the interest of either the USSR or the US. The USSR had made steps which clearly show that <sup>it</sup> wanted to implement the agreement reached. The US should adopt a reasonable position, and then all questions could be resolved.

~~SECRET - EYES ONLY~~

-36-

As to further talks, Mr. Kuznetsov said ~~he was~~ <sup>he was</sup> prepared to continue the discussions at any time, now or at some later date, perhaps tomorrow.

Amb. Stevenson said there was no use rehearsing the IL-28 story. Mr. Kuznetsov had used the President's October 27 letter and concluded the IL-28 aircraft were not included. Amb. Stevenson recalled that he had cited four previous statements in which reference to bombers or ~~other~~ offensive weapon systems other than missiles had been made. Mr. Khrushchev had agreed to remove all weapons the US considered to be offensive, so therefore it was not unreasonable for us to express our views on that point. Mr. Kuznetsov had appealed to us to be reasonable, but we appealed to him to be reasonable. We had indeed been trying hard to be reasonable. Amb. Stevenson thought that in view of Mr. Kuznetsov's rejection one by one of all points raised today, he did not see any ~~hope in continuing~~ the discussion tonight. He hoped that ~~Mr. Kuznetsov would reflect on US~~ <sup>Mr. Kuznetsov</sup> ~~as well as his own~~, and that this would produce a solution of these unsettled problems later. He only hoped that this would be so, because if otherwise ~~then~~ <sup>then</sup> it was clear that there would be a sharp and profound disagreement which would have to be referred to higher authority.

~~SECRET~~

Secretary Gilpatric commented that Ambassador Stevenson and himself would report to the President tonight and tomorrow, and expressed the hope that Mr. Kuznetsov would also report to his government so as to avert this sharp, profound and grave disagreement Mr. Stevenson had alluded to.

Mr. Kuznetsov said that it was the Soviet Union's most sincere desire not to exacerbate the <sup>US-</sup> USSR relations, but to take ~~any~~ every possible step to resolve the problems between the two countries and to eliminate tension. He could only regret that he had apparently failed to convince Ambassador Stevenson and Secretary Gilpatric of the correctness of the Soviet position. He hoped that both Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Gilpatric would reflect on Soviet arguments with a view to finding such solutions as were in the interest of both sides and as would contribute to world peace. He agreed there was ~~no point in~~ continuing tonight and inquired about the next meeting.

Amb. Stevenson replied that he had no suggestion as to the next meeting, but said that he would be available any time. He concluded by saying that he shared <sup>what</sup> Mr. Kuznetsov ~~had said~~ had said: He believed that there was one common thing between our two countries, and that

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-38-

and their responsibility to preserve peace.